From: Katherine COLLIN
Date: 9 May 2002
Subject: Returning Croatian Serb refugees and internally displaces persons to their areas of origin
Executive Summary Introduction Background to the Refugee Problem in Croatia
Problem Statement Problem Definition Barriers to Repatriation Causes Policy Alternatives Policy Recommendation Sources
Over one half of Croatia’s ethnic Serbs were displaced during the wars dissolving the former Yugoslavia. Most displacement was the result of the offensives of the Croatian military forces into Serbian held territory in the summer of 1995. Barriers to return for ethnic Serbs include state actions such as denying citizenship, denying pensions, and denying access to reconstruction aid. The most entrenched barriers to minority return relate to property issues. Many ethnic Croats from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are residing in houses owned by ethnic Serbs. This is generally considered legitimate due to the favorable results of the war for Croatia. Even when Croatian Serbs have established clear legal rights to property, their treatment under the law has been unequal.
In 1998, the Croatian government enacted a plan to increase minority return to Croatia, the National Program of Return. Program implementation exacerbated the problems of Croatian Serbs. Many ethnic Serbs left the country and others were dislocated to group camps. The Program of Return downgraded the status of the Serbian community in Croatia. However, the Program of Return is sound if is properly implemented.
Minority return throughout former Yugoslavia is a priority concern for the international community. Continuing local legal impediments to return bring the international goals in the region into doubt. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has been an advocate of returning Croatian Serbs to their area of origin, and more consistent pressure in this direction is appropriate. With the goal of increased Serb return to Croatia, I recommend that the Stability Pact use continued development and reconstruction aid disbursements to the Croatian government to push for the equitable implementation of the Program of Return.
While refugee return has been difficult throughout former Yugoslavia since the Dayton Accords made peace in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1995, minority return in Croatia has been particularly problematic. This difficulty is due to state policies and laws which render repatriation and property reclamation difficult for ethnic Serbs. These policies form barriers to repatriating Croatian Serb refugees. Croatian Serb internally displaced persons are blocked from returning to their areas of origin and have been leaving Croatia altogether. The root causes of the legal problems are the ethnic nationalist orientation of the government in Zagreb.
Nationalist ideology in Croatia now assumes that ethnic Croats “won” the war and therefore are entitled to certain discriminatory laws quickly put in place against ethnic Serbs by the Tudjman government. These policies represent a major change in the approach to ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia. Policy in former Yugoslavia could be described as cultural pluralism, encouraging ethnic groups to live together within republics. This policy encourages a cultural melting into a “Yugoslav” identity in the economic cores of former Yugoslavia. In urban areas of ethnically mixed regions, intermarriage was common. This pattern holds for Croatia, where there were many ethnically mixed families before the war. Ethnic Serbs in mixed families have been treated better in Croatia than minorities from mixed families in Bosnia. These Serbs were assumed to be acculturated into Croatian society. Ethnic nationalism reversed these more liberal, assimilationist ethnic policies and provided political saliency to the wars. A continuation of ethnic nationalist policy should be discouraged in the region. A return to ethnically tolerant policy is a move away from the ultimate causes of the war and will help to eventually stabilize the region.
The international community can effect changes in the Croatian government’s behavior, and in this instance it is in the interest of Western powers involved in regional reconstruction to do so. International funding and acceptance into international bodies has motivated Zagreb to alter its policies towards returning refugees in the past. This movement can be encouraged given greater international attention to the issue.
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is in a good position to be an international body applying such pressure. It is a coordinating body for Western European funds disbursed for stability in the Balkans. The issue of minority return will be a crux of future Balkan stability, and the Stability Pact can advocate for meaningful improvements to Croatian law.
In 2000, when Stipe Mesic won the presidency after the death of the nationalist wartime leader Franjo Tudjman, the Stability Pact was able to influence Mesic to review the refugee policy of Tudjman in connection with a large grant for repatriating refugees. In 1998, an international donor’s conference in Zagreb was able to force Tudjman to change the most ethnically restrictive elements of property law pertaining to refugees. At this time, Tudjman’s government wrote the National Program of Return to facilitate Serbian and other minority repatriation. Neither Mesic nor Tudjman has properly implemented the Program of Return, but the Stability Pact can influence the Croatian government to do so.
Background to the Refugee Problem in Croatia
The war in Croatia between 1991 and 1995 produced a large volume of refugees. Up to 15% of the population was displaced internally or internationally at some time during the conflict (IDP database, 2002). The demographic makeup of Croatia has been permanently altered by the war. The Serbian population, once the largest minority resident in Croatia has been halved as a result of conflict. The 2001 census reports that the Serbs comprise roughly 5% of the population, compared with 12% in 1991(Human Rights Watch, 2002).
Croatia declared independence in 1991 and fought a war with the Yugoslav army (JNA) and with Serbian paramilitary groups. This fighting subsided in 1992. Croatia also participated in the war inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and in 1995 reclaimed large territories within Croatia held by Serbs since 1991.
During the initial fighting in Croatia, the Croatian Serbs and the JNA helped to carve out territory from the former Yugoslav republic that comprised almost a third of Croatia. The area became an internationally unrecognized, ethnic Serb state: Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK). RSK held most of the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and also included Slavonia in the Danubian region bordering Serbia. The capture of RSK territories by ethnic Serbs sent 220,000 Croatians out of these areas (IDP database, 2002). At the same time, RSK and Croatia hosted many refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1995, Bosnian Serbs held congruent territories to the RSK in northwestern Bosnia. The Bosnian area also included several Muslim enclaves, including a significant area in which Muslims had fought with ethnic Serbian forces.
In the summer of 1995, Croatian forces captured most of the RSK areas in two operations: Flash and Storm. Flash took Western Slavonia, leaving Eastern Slavonia, and Storm took the Krajina. Operation Storm took place between August 4 and 7 in 1995 and produced 200,000 ethnic Serb refugees and IDPs who generally fled to Eastern Slavonia, Serb held areas of Bosnia, and Serbia. Operation Storm is associated with many violations of international humanitarian law, including attacks on retreating civilians, executions of civilians, the use of civilians and international peacekeepers as shields, attacks on several UN peacekeeping posts, and widespread systematic destruction of Serbian property. Most estimates report that up to 200,000 Serbs left the area as a result of Operation Storm. An estimated 5,000 remained in the area, generally the elderly, and those with Croatian familial contacts (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 15). There were reported executions of some Serbs who remained in the area after the military operation, particularly the elderly (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 17).
This was accomplished with American support. The United States had military advisors inside Croatia for several months before Flash and Storm, having signed a military cooperation agreement in 1994 (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 3). There is further indirect evidence of more extensive US involvement in Operation Storm.
The United Nations was present in Croatia before 1995. Beginning in 1992, the United Nations had three “protected areas” in Croatia: Krajina, Western Slavonia, and Eastern Slavonia. These protected areas were the responsibility of the peacekeeper observers: UNPROFOR. In November 1995 with the signing of the Erdut Agreement, the only RSK territories that remained under Serbian jurisdiction, Eastern Slavonia, were transferred to United Nations authority. The UN established the United Nations Transitional Authority of Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) and administered the territory until January 1998, at which time it reverted to Zagreb’s control.
The refugee and internal displacement flows resulting from all of these changes in jurisdiction have been considerable. Operation Flash displaced roughly 100,000 Croatian Serbs and Operation Storm displaced roughly 200,000. In order to create Serb authority in the Krajina region in 1991, Croatian Serbs expelled 85,000 Croats from the area (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 2), and the Slavonia ethnic cleansing sent 135,000 Croats into other parts of Croatia (IDP database, 2002). Croatia is also the host country for as many as 350,000 Bosnian Croat refugees (IDP database, 2002).
Croatian Serb refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) face special barriers to returning to their pre-war homes, and a low number have been able to do so since the close of the war. Since 1998 and the return of Eastern Slavonia to Croatia, the number of Croatian Serbs internally displaced has been drastically reduced. Serbs are leaving the country altogether and going either to Serbia, Republika Srpska - Bosnia, or a third country. While 17,000 to 21,000 Serbs had relocated by 1999 from Eastern Slavonia to their places of former residence in other areas of Croatia (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 45), the pre-war Serbian population in the area was 70,000. 3,500 to 4,000 Serb IDPs remain in the Danube region as of 2001 (IDP database, 2002). These numbers indicate that a large number of Croatian Serbs from Eastern Slavonia, roughly 46,000, have become refugees since the 1998. These numbers are indicative of the larger trend of blocked refugee repatriation for Croatian Serbs.
Roughly 56,000 Serbs have returned to Croatia from Serbia and Bosnia since 1995. 23,000 Serb IDPs from Eastern Slavonia have been repatriated to their home areas, if not always their homes (Human Rights Watch 1999, p. 47). An unknown number of these have been commuter returnees, moving between their homes and their places of refuge. The large bulk of refugees have returned since 1999/2000, suggesting a positive change since the regime change in the Croatian government. Up to 1999, the UNHCR estimated that only 6,500 refugees had returned to Croatia (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 51). Of the refugees that returned under Tudjman, most of these were cases involving family reunification and property that was intact and unoccupied. By 2002, 35,000 of the 56,000 Croatian Serb returnees came back to Croatia through so-called spontaneous return (without registering with the Croatian government or with UNHCR), generally available only to the least vulnerable displaced persons (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2002, paragraph 4).
Most IDPs returned to their home areas after the end of the UNTAES mandate in 1998. The demography of the returnees is predominantly elderly: eighty percent or more are sixty or older. The age distribution among returnees indicates the failing economy in the area and the importance of pension issues to the Serb returnees.
Problem Definition: Barriers to Resettlement
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the number of Croatian Serbs successfully returned to their residence of 1991 or to a reconstructed residence in the same area.
Independent Variables
A number of independent variables will influence the success of the return of Croatian Serbs. These factors should be considered together as indicative of trends for the returnees. The overall effect of the trend is greater than the effects of the individual components. These factors include: security of the returnees, economic conditions in war-affected areas, accessibility of housing, accessibility of agricultural lands, accessibility of pensions, the ability of returnees to enter Croatia, the accessibility of the justice system, equality under the law, and the application of justice for war crimes.
In a rational choice model of pushes and pulls factoring into a decision to migrate, refugees and IDPs have a choice between three options: permanent resettlement in the area of original refuge, leaving the area of refuge to resettle in a third location, or returning home. The pull to return home is great and understandable for every refugee. Each independent variable will function either to reinforce the pull home or to push the refugee or IDP towards permanent settlement elsewhere.
Intervening Variables
An intervening variable is the ability and willingness of Bosnian refugees in Croatia to repatriate. Bosnian Croats have been a source of insecurity for returning Croatian Serbs and have often been resettled in Serbian houses, preventing Serb reoccupation. Their continued residence in Croatia will impact returning Serbs.
Another intervening variable is the disposition of the government in Zagreb toward Serb returnees. Tudjman was motivated by a desire to unify with the Bosnian Croats and a belief in an ethnically clean Croatia. Tudjman’s policies made repatriation difficult for Serbs. While the laws were later changed under international pressure, these changes failed to improve conditions on the ground due to a lack of political will. While the Mesic government is far more conciliatory and democratic, the goal of unification with the Croatian entity in Bosnia may remain. Ultimately, the disposition of the government has a huge impact on the ability of minority refugees to repatriate.
The barriers to resettlement are numerous and have been at times comprehensive. In 1995 and 1996, the Sabor, the Croatian Parliament, passed a series of laws making the return of Serbian refugees much more difficult. These laws complemented the abridgment of political rights of Serbs within Croatia and the deeply insecure situation for remaining Serbs, especially in former RSK areas. Since this time, these laws have been changed or replaced and security for Serbs has been improved. However, the barriers to return remain due to the uneven application of new laws.
Destruction of Housing
The Croatian government estimates damage to housing stock, including houses and apartments, at 171,705 properties (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 6). This represents ten percent of the national housing stock. The percentage is much higher in war-affected areas, which are predominately the areas to which Serbs would return. The greatest loss of housing was in the Krajina region as a result of Operation Storm. In the Krajina, Serbian owned houses were destroyed and burned in what some observers have described as a scorched earth policy by the Croatian forces. Initial estimates of the number of houses destroyed are over 5,000. Thirty to sixty percent of houses were destroyed in the Krajina (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 13). In mixed villages, Serbs’ houses were selected for destruction. Serbian villages were destroyed wholesale. This included the burning of agricultural lands and the destruction of livestock.
Inaccessibility of Housing
Houses that are intact are often inaccessible for potential returnees because they are occupied by Croatian IDPs or Bosnian Croat refugees. Up to 120,000 ethnic Croat IDPs have returned to their original homes since 1995 (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2002, paragraph 5). Slavonia has received the bulk of these returnees. Additionally, many Bosnian Croats were resettled throughout the former RSK territories. Since 1995, 142,000 Bosnian Croat refugees have been permanently resettled inside Croatia: acquiring citizenship and de-registering their refugee status. Non-governmental organizations charge that many of these refugees are living in the houses and apartments of Croatian Serbs refugees and IDPs (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2002, paragraph 10).
In 1995, the Sabor passed two laws enabling the government to assign houses abandoned by displaced persons to be temporarily assigned to IDPs and refugees. The Law on the Temporary Takeover and Administration of Specified Property (LTTO), assigned property and the Law on Areas of Special State Concern allows the government to award permanent rights to property after a time specified by the LTTO (generally ten years). In practice, the laws were applied to properties abandoned by Croatian Serbs and given to displaced Croats from Slavonia and Bosnia. Agricultural lands were also assigned under the LTTO, impacting the economic viability of resettlement in these agricultural regions. No reliable government estimate exists on how many properties were assigned under the LTTO.
The 1995 Law on The Status of Displaced Persons and Refugees prevents the courts from awarding property to an original owner unless suitable alternative accommodation for the current occupant exists. This law applied to ethnic Croats but not to ethnic Serbs, which has meant that while Serbs were unable to regain their property that had been temporarily assigned to a displaced person, Croats were able to reclaim property from Serbs. These Serbs were then displaced a second time.
In Eastern Slavonia, after the withdrawal of the UN transitional authority, a special regulation on property reclamation applied: the Operational Agreement between Croatia and the UN. The Operational Agreement applied the regulations of the Law on the Status of Displaced Persons and Refugees to both Serbs and Croats. In 1999 and 2000, this led to many so called “soft-evictions” of Serbs by original Croat owners. Original owners evicted Serb occupants without a court order through intimidation. Extra-legal evictions have meant that those who loose temporary housing through intimidation have no alternative accommodation.
While the Law on Areas of Special State Concern remains in force, the LTTO was replaced in 1998 by a law on the repatriation of refugees and the reclamation of property: the Program for the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons (the Program of Return). The LTTO was repealed in response to an international donor’s conference held that year for Croatia. Donors wanted to see meaningful progress on refugee return.
The Program of Return established municipal councils to arbitrate claims on occupied property. The councils were made up of five members and two were required to represent minorities. These bodies could issue evictions, but these evictions could only go into effect if there were other available accommodation for the occupants.
The application of the Program of Return was very uneven. There were no instructions for its implementation, and local bodies were left to themselves to decide if they should apply the Program without further instruction and what constituted acceptable alternative accommodation. The housing commissions in Eastern Slavonia were the most active in taking on cases and issuing evictions. Eastern Slavonia was the last refuge of Croatian Serbs and had the largest number of Serbs occupying Croat houses. The evictions have generally removed Serb occupants in favor of Croat owners. Similar activity has not been taken in other regions, which would have allowed Serbs evicted in Slavonia to reclaim property elsewhere. Acceptable alternative accommodation has been a varied standard, with some housing commissions unwilling to issue an eviction without the original house of the occupant available. Other housing commissions have evicted occupants who have ended up in temporary housing provided by the government, containers provided by the UNHCR, and in collective centers or camps. As stated above, many Serbs simply leave Croatia rather than stay in collective camps or go through further displacement. Of those Serbs in Eastern Slavonia displaced by courts and housing commissions, less than half have returned to the areas they are originally from and less than a quarter have returned to their actual homes. More ethnic Serbs have left Eastern Slavonia for third countries as refugees, 29,000, than have returned to their areas of origin in other parts of Croatia (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 12, 59).
The Mesic government acknowledged the flaws of the Program of Return in 2000 and suspended the activities of the housing commissions pending a review. As of 2002, the commissions are still not functioning. Housing cases are now either on hold or decided through local courts, and in these cases courts tend to favor ethnic Croats over Serbs (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p 3).
Exacerbating the problems associated with loss of housing for resettlement is the unequal treatment of Croatians and Serbs in accessing government funding for housing reconstruction. The Reconstruction Act of March 1996 makes available government funds for the reconstruction of housing damaged in the war. It sets up a list of priority cases for the disbursement of the funding. Funds are available for destruction of types I through III, meaning houses that are damaged but not totally destroyed. Houses with type IV and V damage are paid for through international programs.
The Reconstruction Act states that eligible property is property damaged as a result of the aggression from Serb and Montenegrin forces and paramilitaries, which excludes houses that were damaged as a result of operations conducted by Croatian forces. Furthermore, these properties should be damaged through acts of war, and the government does not consider the burnings following Operation Flash and Storm as direct war damage but as terrorist acts not covered by the law.
The deadline to apply for reconstruction assistance was in 1997, at which time the great bulk of Croatian Serbs displaced were still outside of Croatia. The law further states that Croatian citizens must apply for the reconstruction aid, and as many Croatian Serbs have been disqualified from citizenship they have been unable to access funds for any qualified property. (See below on citizenship issues.) The law does make exceptions in the case of immigrants. Bosnian Croats are able to access funding for housing assigned to them under the LTTO, but only ethnic Croats are eligible for this provision.
One result of the Reconstruction Act is that generally Croatian Serbs rely on international funding for reconstruction aid. In general, local governments require international agencies to fund equally projects for ethnic Serbs and Croats, and therefore, the international community’s ability to make up for the shortfall of domestic funding to Serb homeowners is limited.
Under the socialist system in Yugoslavia, residents had tenancy rights on socially owned apartments. While the apartments were not owned, tenancy rights bestowed on tenants the right to stay and to pass on the apartment. The 1991 Law on Abandoned Apartments declared tenancy rights on apartments vacated by the displaced to be terminated. The 1995 Law on the Lease of Apartments in Liberated Areas terminated tenancy rights after ninety days. The 1995 law was repealed in 1998 with the LTTO. Recourse is only through the courts for those with lost tenancy rights. Croatian courts have been slow and do not necessarily yield positive results for ethnic Serbs in property cases.
Inaccessibility of Citizenship
Under the federal system of former Yugoslavia, Yugoslav citizens held citizenship for both Yugoslavia and for their republic (one the six republics that comprised federal Yugoslavia). Republic citizenship had no bearing on the legal right to live and work and was a matter of personal pursuit. In Croatia, a baby born in the republic automatically received Croatian citizenship only if both parents were Croatian citizens. Many Serbs living in Croatia considered their identity to be either Serbian or Yugoslav, and many did not have Croatian citizenship.
Croatia’s laws on citizenship, passed in 1991, require even lifetime residents who did not hold Croatian republic citizenship to gain citizenship through naturalization. Those born in Croatia who can show that one parent was born with Croatian citizenship are excepted and ethnic Croats may also be excepted from having to naturalize. The Croatian government has five requirements for naturalization: 1. To be eighteen years old or older and able to work. 2. To renounce other citizenship. 3. To have five years of residency in Croatia, interpreted to be continuous and immediately preceding the request for naturalization. 4. To be familiar with the Croatian language in the Latin alphabet. 5. To show respect for the legal order of the state and “acceptance” of the customs of Croatian culture (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 27). Serb IDPs have been refused naturalization on the fifth criterion. Croatian Serb refugees have lost their qualification on the third criterion and need to reside inside Croatia five years to regain eligibility. During this time, the returnee has no access to courts, state aid, or the Program of Return. Additionally, ethnic Serbs are charged a $225 fee to process their naturalization application, while the application for ethnic Croats is free.
Croatian Serb refugees without Croatian documents are unable to pass into Crotia without permission from a Croatian consulate. This permission can be difficult to obtain.
Economic Factors
The major problem for returnees with RSK documents has been securing pensions for time worked during the RSK period. The 1997 Law of Convalidation was intended to aleviate this problem by allowing recognition of time worked and the payment of pensions. Most refugees were not able to apply for the benefits of the law within the time allowed. The issue of pensions is especially important for returnees, the majority of whom are seniors.
While most of the Krajina is agricultural, Slavonia had comparably more industry in the pre-war years. These industries are currently depressed and many workers have lost jobs. Croatia has a high unemployment rate, as high as eighty-five percent in some areas in 2000 (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2002, paragraph 23). Returnees face harsh economic conditions. This is exacerbated by the lack of access to agricultural land and the financial burdens of rebuilding. An additional problem for the agricultural sector is landmines. An estimated 400,000 to one million land mines remain in Croatia, and this hampers agricultural activities, especially in war-affected areas (UNHCR, 2000). At the same time, the areas to which potential returnees have gone, Republika Srpska Bosnia and Serbia, are also economically depressed and do not offer economic incentives for permanent resettlement.
In the year 2000, Croatia elected a new president and government after the death of the wartime leader, Franjo Tudjman. The change was a breakthrough for refugees and by the end of the year up to 20,000 Croatian Serb refugees had returned to Croatia. Mesic also suspended the housing commissions for the Program of Return in order to review their performance. The Law on the Status of Displaced Persons and Refugees was changed, as was the Law on Reconstruction. Mesic invited all refugees who wished to return back to Croatia.
Rhetorically, Mesic has been a great improvement over Tudjman. The security situation for returnees Serbs has continued to improve (with some exceptions), and Serb refugees have responded by returning in much larger numbers immediately following the election of Mesic. However, the Program of Return remains under review, no action has been taken to address lost tenancy rights, securing adequate reconstruction funding is difficult, and the problem of property reclamation remains.
An increasing phenomenon is multiple-occupancy, when returned IDPs and refugees maintain occupancy in the houses where they found shelter, as well as other residences, in order to deny the original owner repossession (IDP database, 2002).
Bosnian Croats have grown politically restive in the Muslim-Croat Federation and agitate for greater independence within Bosnia. As Tudjman did, Mesic encourages this political separatism in Bosnia and gives a great deal of economic support to Croatian areas of Bosnia. Mesic’s mandate may rest with ethnic nationalism and thus casts doubt on the sincerity of the reforms meant to attract Croatian Serbs back to Croatia.
Proximate Causes
The proximate, immediate causes of the low number of Croatian Serb repatriating refugees and returning IDPs are the legal barriers to repatriation. Outstanding of these barriers are issues surrounding property reclamation. Property issues touch on most aspects of problems facing returnees: inability to reoccupy former homes because of occupation or destruction, inability to access satisfactory court decisions to reoccupy property, inability to access funding to rebuild damaged housing, inability to use agricultural land. Property reclamation is fundamental for returning refugees throughout former Yugoslavia. Without satisfactorily addressing access to property, the percentage of Croatian Serbs returning will not improve.
Ultimate Causes
The ultimate, underlying causes of the low number of Croatian Serb returnees are rooted in the ability of the state to continue ethnic nationalist appeals. Ethnic Serbs faced discriminatory laws under Tudjman and they face unequal application of the law under Mesic. The Program of Return, which on paper seems designed to allow minority return, functioned between 1998 and 2000 to evict Serbs in Eastern Slavonia and encourage ethnic Serb IDPs to leave the country. Ethnic Serbs who use the court as their only option to regain property, as in the case of lost tenancy rights, wait years for a decision on their rights. While the new government has amended laws and is reviewing the Program of Return, uneven application of the law maintains barriers to return.
Bosnian Croats have been agitating increasingly for independence from the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia, and Mesic seems to support this, paying visits to the unofficial Bosnian-Croat capital of Mostar. The fate of the political settlement in Bosnia is important because it is the clearest signal of what the international community will support, and because of the large number of Bosnian Croats in Croatia. These former refugees are concentrated in areas of potential Croatian Serb return, and the majority of security problems from returning ethnic Serbs have come from Bosnian Croats (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p.2). To the extent that Bosnian Croats in both Bosnia and Croatia are a source of support of the government in Zagreb, these issues will continue to affect opportunities of Serbs to return.
The Role of the International Community
With Croatia, the international community has mixed calls for improved policies toward displaced Serbs and toleration of continuing barriers to Serb resettlement. In 1998 at an international donor’s conference in Zagreb, property rights issues and the condition of Croatian Serb refugees were used to encourage changes in Croatia’s laws. In 2000, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe tied a $63 million loan to conditions for returning Croatian Serbs. The international community has been able to effect changes in policy with both Tudjman and Mesic. However, the extent to which this influence has been used to actually improve the situation for displaced Croatian Serbs is open to question. International opinion, funding, and membership in European multinational organizations remain strong tools for changing Croatian policy.
Policy Goals
Three potentially contradictory policy goals guide the policy recommendation.
| The maximum return of displaced Croatian Serbs to Croatia, their area of origin, and their homes. |
| The preservation of Croatian and regional political stability. |
| To diffuse ethnically based grievances, setting an acceptable precedent for the future. |
The second policy goal will be most affected by the overall approach to the region and to any future political changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The stability of Croatia is at much less risk than that of Bosnia, especially after the successful change of power in 2000. Finally, any policy should focus on the problems of property, which are most central to minority return.
Continued resettlement of Croatian Serb refugees in third countries and continued emigration of Croatian Serb IDPs. While a large influx of refugees arrived in Croatia in 2000 after the election of Mesic, it would be unexpected for any more major surges of returnees to arrive in Croatia. The Croatian demographic would remain similar to today’s, with the size of the Serbian minority more than halved.
The political situation in Serbia is much more settled now, and the economic future there may improve in the near future with a reintegration of Serbia into the international community. This would eliminate major push factors for refugees settled there, and Serbia shelters the majority of Croatian Serb refugees. The more time that passes, the less likely refugees are to return to their countries of origin.
For IDPs, push factors to leave Croatia remain strong. Evictions continue through court action and through intimidation. As of December 2001, only 3,500 Croatian Serb IDPs remained in Eastern Slavonia (U.S Committee for Refugees, 2002, paragraph 25). The continued existence of collective centers for evicted Serb IDPs and economic circumstances will encourage Serb IDPs who loose their shelter to leave the country.
This policy option would fail to meet the first policy goal, and may fail to meet the second. If the Dayton Accords hold without major changes, and an increasing number of minority returns are allowed in Bosnia, the relative lack of minority returns to Croatia may become a point of contention within the region. If, however, the Dayton Accords are amended to allow the Muslim-Croat Federation to become two entities with quasi independence on the Republika Srpska model, minority return may not become a serious issue among the states of the former Yugoslavia.
The third goal is also dependent on the settlement of the conditions of the second. However, many refugees and IDPs have been dispossessed without compensation. This could be added to a list of ethnic grievances between the groups and become an issue in any further regional ethnic conflicts.
The second policy option would be to accept that further return of Croatian Serbs to their homes and other property is unlikely. In this case, the international community, in cooperation with the Croatian government could dedicate funds that might otherwise be used in repatriation and reconstruction programs to compensate displaced persons for their loss of property. The greatest potential problem facing this option would be the expense involved. Any monetary compensation of Croatian refugees would set a precedent for compensation of refugees from Bosnia and Kosovo. Other war victims have been compensated for property losses (Jewish victims of World War Two, ethnic Japanese in the United States, compensation of war victims is included in the charter of the International Criminal Court), but the expense might be prohibitive. This option would meet the second and third policy goals but not the first.
An effective implementation of the Program of Return would facilitate the return of displaced Serbs to their homes. The structure of the program as written is sound: creating pools of unused housing that can accommodate evicted IDPs while they wait for similar decisions on their homes, local minority representation on the housing boards, no eviction without acceptable alternative accommodation. For the successful implementation of the program, meaning enabling minority as well as Croat repossession of property, direction from the central government is crucial. Central implementation guidelines would help in the egalitarian application of the law: standards on acceptable alternative accommodation, doing away with collective centers, and ensuring timely court decisions on evictions with questions. Multiple-occupancy needs to be addressed. Success in the Program of Return would allow IDPs to return and this may encourage refugees to repatriate. This would meet the first policy goal but not possible the second and third.
On the second policy goal, the problem of imeplementability for this alternative would be the potential clash between returning Serbs and resident Bosnian Croats. With the percentage of damaged housing stock in war affected areas still high, there would be competition for the limited resources of housing and agricultural land. Bosnian Croats have been given rights to Serb owned property, have become naturalized Croatian citizens, and feel that they have won the war. The local resistance to loosing housing to make way for returning Serbs is potentially fierce. While Croatian Serb returnees would feel this policy just, Bosnian Croats in Croatia might not agree. A security component may be a wise addition to this policy alternative. This alternative also relies heavily on the will of the Croatian government, and the government’s position on increased return remains unclear despite public declarations that Serbs are welcome home.
Because the first policy goal of returning Croatian Serbs to their homes takes precedence over the other two policy goals, the policy recommendation is the third policy option: functional enactment of the Program of Return. The Program of Return addresses the proximate causes of return problems in its concentration on property issues. This policy requires the most of the Croatian government, but it is the only option that could provide realistic opportunity of return to Croatian Serbs. As opposed to past international efforts in this regard, pressure on the issue must be maintained over a sufficient amount of time to stimulate changes in policy implementation. This can be enacted with international pressure, supervision, and, if necessary, funding.
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